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SHACKLING SHORT SELLERS:  THE 2008 SHORTING BAN 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In September 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) surprised the 
investment community by adopting an emergency order that temporarily banned most short sales 
in nearly 1,000 financial stocks.  In this paper, we study changes in stock prices, the rate of short 
sales, the aggressiveness of short sellers, and various liquidity measures before, during, and after 
the shorting ban.  We match banned stocks to a control group of non-banned stocks in order to 
identify these effects.  Shorting activity drops by about 65%.  Stocks subject to the ban suffered a 
severe degradation in market quality, as measured by spreads, price impacts, and intraday 
volatility.  Prices of stocks subject to the ban increase sharply, but it is difficult to assign this 
effect to the ban because the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and other initiatives were 
announced the same day.  In fact, we find no positive share price effects in stocks that were 
added to the ban list later, suggesting that the ban may not have provided much of an artificial 
price boost. 1.  Introduction 
For the most part, financial economists consider short sellers to be the “good guys,” 
unearthing overvalued companies and contributing to efficient stock prices.  Even as late as the 
summer of 2007, regulators in the United States seemed to share this view, as they made life 
easier for short sellers by repealing the NYSE’s uptick rule and other short-sale price tests that 
had impeded shorting activity since the Great Depression (see Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang 
(2009) for an analysis of this event).  But short sellers are often the scapegoats when share prices 
fall sharply, and regulators in the United States did a sharp U-turn in 2008, imposing tight new 
restrictions on short sellers as the financial crisis worsened. 
In September 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) surprised the 
investment community by adopting an emergency order that temporarily banned most short sales 
in nearly 1,000 financial stocks.  In this paper, we study changes in stock prices, the rate of short 
sales, the aggressiveness of short sellers, and various liquidity measures before, during, and after 
the shorting ban.  We compare banned stocks to a control group of non-banned stocks in order to 
identify these effects. 
We find that during the shorting ban, shorting activity drops by about 65%.  Stocks 
subject to the ban suffered a severe degradation in market quality, as measured by spreads, price 
impacts, and intraday volatility.  Price effects are a bit harder to assign to the ban, as there is 
substantial confounding news about TARP and other government programs to assist the financial 
sector on the day that the ban is announced and implemented.  When we look at firms that are 
added later to the ban list (for these firms, confounding contemporaneous events are less of a 
problem), we do not find a price bump at all.  In fact, these stocks consistently underperform 
during the whole period the ban is in effect.  This suggests that the shorting ban did not provide 
much of an artificial boost in prices. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews related literature, and a detailed 
timeline of events related to the shorting ban is the subject of section 3.  Section 4 discusses the 
data, including proprietary intraday NYSE and Nasdaq data on short sales, and provides some 
overall summary statistics.  Section 5 discusses the methodology we use, particularly the two-
way fixed effect models we use to isolate the effect of the shorting ban.  Results start in section 6 
with an analysis of changes in shorting activity.  Section 7 discusses effects on share prices.  
Section 8 examines changes in effective spreads, short-term volatility, and other market quality 
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 measures.  Market-makers were still able to short during the ban, and in section 9, we 
characterize their shorting style.  Section 10 concludes. 
 
2.  Literature review 
Theoretical models with differences in beliefs predict that constraints on short sales 
should cause stock prices to rise and become overvalued.  In models such as Miller (1977) and 
Harrison and Kreps (1978), shorting restrictions mean that pessimists are shut out of the market, 
and optimists do not take into account the absence of pessimists in setting prices.  Prices thus 
become too high.  In Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002), the shorting restrictions come in the 
form of search frictions in the share lending market, and these frictions make it impossible for 
short sellers to return prices all the way to fundamentals.  On the other hand, if all agents have 
rational expectations, as in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), they do not agree to disagree, and 
shorting prohibitions do not cause stock prices to be biased on average (though shorting 
prohibitions slow down the adjustment of prices to negative news). 
A few recent papers consider the possibility that so-called “bear raids” or other kinds of 
manipulative shorting activity could lead to lower prices.  Goldstein and Guembel (2008) show 
that short sellers have an incentive to manipulate if they can somehow cause the company to 
experience negative real effects.  However, Khanna and Mathews (2009) emphasize that those 
with long positions have strong incentives to counter such activity via their own trading 
behavior. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) point out that short sellers are more likely to be 
informed, as they would never initiate a short sale for liquidity reasons.  The empirical evidence 
in the literature provides uniform support for this hypothesis.  Dechow et al. (2001), Desai, 
Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006), Cohen, Diether, and Malloy (2007), and Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang (2008) show that in aggregate short sellers appear to trade based on (and be 
well-informed about) fundamentals, and they earn excess returns.  Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and 
Swan (1998) show that in Australia, where a short sale is publicly identified as such immediately 
on execution, short sales have a larger impact on price than regular-way sales. 
Generally, the evidence supports the models with differences in beliefs rather than the 
rational expectations or bear raid alternatives.  When short sellers’ information is not 
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 incorporated into prices because shorting is costly, difficult, or prohibited, the evidence indicates 
that stocks can get overvalued.  For example, Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Mitchell, Pulvino, 
and Stafford (2002) show that during the late 1990’s, spinoffs in the tech sector were so 
overpriced that arbitrage (or something very close to arbitrage) should have been possible, but 
short positions were very difficult to establish.  Pontiff (1996) provides similar evidence for 
closed-end funds.  Jones and Lamont (2002) show that in the 1920’s and 1930’s, stocks that were 
expensive to short had abnormally low future returns, even after accounting for shorting costs. 
A number of researchers have also studied market structure changes that make it easier or 
harder to short.  For example, Jones (2008) finds significant price effects when shorting is 
restricted during the Great Depression.  Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) show that the introduction 
of listed options on a given stock eases shorting constraints and reduces share prices slightly.  Ho 
(1996) finds an increase in stock return volatility when short sales were restricted during the Pan 
Electric crisis in the Singapore market in 1985-1986.  Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007) find price 
effects in Hong Kong when specific stocks are designated as eligible for shorting.  Rhee (2003) 
finds some evidence of price effects in Japan following imposition of an uptick rule there.  In 
contrast, Diether, Werner, and Lee (2009) find that Regulation SHO’s pilot program to suspend 
short sale price tests does not affect share prices, and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009) find 
similar evidence when U.S. short sale price tests are removed completely in 2007. 
Shorting restrictions also affect liquidity and the adjustment of prices to new information.  
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) predict that if there are shorting constraints, prices will adjust 
more slowly to negative information.  Reed (2007) finds an asymmetric price adjustment in 
response to information about earnings, and Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) find that 
downward price moves are slower in markets where shorting is prohibited.  Using weekly data 
on share lending supply and borrowing fees from 26 markets, Saffi and Sigurdsson (2007) show 
that less constrained firms (proxied by high lending supply and a low borrowing fee) are more 
efficiently priced in that they have shorter price delays.  Boehmer and Wu (2008) document that 
short selling makes prices more informationally efficient and reduces post-earnings 
announcement drift.  Diether, Werner, and Lee (2009) find that the 2005 pilot program to 
suspend price tests in the U.S. slightly worsens some measures of market quality, and Boehmer, 
Jones, and Zhang (2009) find that market quality worsens further when the uptick rule is 
repealed completely. 
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 Finally, we are aware of at least four other papers written contemporaneously with ours 
analyzing the same events.  Harris, Namvar, and Phillips (2009) focus on stock price effects of 
the U.S. event using a factor approach, while Beber and Pagano (2009) use recent shorting bans 
in various jurisdictions and an international panel of stocks to assess the effect of shorting bans 
on liquidity.  Battalio and Schultz (2009) focus on migration to the individual equity options 
markets during the ban, while Kolasinksi, Reed, and Thornock (2009) also study naked shorting 
prohibitions and analyze the effects on the stock lending market. 
 
3.  Timeline of events 
The temporary ban on the shorting of financial stocks is the most recent in a sequence of 
regulatory efforts to throw sand in the gears of short sellers and make it more difficult or costly 
to take a short position in embattled financial stocks.  The first move in this direction took place 
in July 2008, when the SEC issued an emergency order restricting naked shorting (where the 
short seller fails to borrow shares and deliver them to the buyer on the settlement date) in 19 
financial stocks.  After the emergency order expired in mid-August, the SEC returned on the 
evening of Wednesday, September 17 with a permanent ban on naked shorting in all U.S. stocks, 
effective at 12:01am ET on Thursday, September 18.  On Thursday, September 18, the U.K.’s 
Financial Services Authority instituted a temporary ban on short sales in 32 financial stocks, 
effective the next day (Friday, September 19).  The FSA shorting ban was accompanied by a 
requirement to disclose short positions in these stocks that were in excess of 0.25% of the shares 
outstanding.  Both measures were to remain in force until January 16, 2009. 
That same day (Thursday, September 18, 2008), after the U.S. market closed for the day, 
the SEC matched the FSA, surprising the market with a temporary ban on all short sales in 797 
financial stocks.
1  The SEC’s emergency order (release no. 34-58592) was issued pursuant to its 
authority in Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it was effective 
immediately.  The initial order covered 10 business days, terminating at 11:59 p.m. ET on Oct. 2, 
2008, but could be extended under the law to last for a maximum of 30 calendar days.
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1 The emergency order claimed to cover 799 stocks, but only 797 were actually listed in the order. 
2 At the same time, the Commission announced that all institutional short sellers would have to report their daily 
shorting activity, and the Commission announced aggressive investigations into possible manipulation by short 
sellers. 
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 The details of the shorting ban are important for understanding the effect of the event.  
For example, the last time shorting was banned in the United States was in September 1931, 
when the New York Stock Exchange banned all short sales in the wake of England’s 
announcement that it was abandoning the gold standard.  As Jones (2008) recounts, all short 
sales were banned in that case, including short sales by specialists and other market-makers, 
which provoked something akin to a short squeeze by buyers who realized that at least in the 
short-term there would be few that could stand in the way of their efforts to drive prices up. 
In 2008, the SEC did not repeat the NYSE’s earlier mistake.  The emergency order 
contained a limited exception for market-makers (defined in the emergency order as “registered 
market makers, block positioners, or other market makers obligated to quote in the over-the-
counter market”) that were selling short as part of bona fide market making activity.  Also, the 
shorting ban became effective on a so-called “triple witching day,” the last day of trading before 
expiration of index options, equity options on individual stocks, and index futures.  Barclay, 
Hendershott, and Jones (2008) provide some recent evidence on the very large order imbalances 
and excess volatility present on these days.  To prevent large price swings around these 
expirations, the SEC decided to grant options market makers a 24-hour delay so that they too 
could sell short as part of their market making and hedging activities. 
The ban was implemented quite hastily, and many details evolved over time.  On Sunday, 
September 21, the SEC announced (in release 34-58611) technical amendments to the original 
ban, all of which were effective immediately.  There were three main elements.  First, the SEC 
delegated to the exchanges all decisions about the ban status of a listed firm.  Listing markets 
were to designate the individual financial institutions to be covered, and were authorized to 
exclude firms from the ban list on their request.  Second, options market-makers were to remain 
exempt from the shorting ban for the duration of the emergency order, and the SEC clarified that 
all registered market makers were exempt, including over-the-counter market makers and those 
making markets in exchange traded funds (ETFs).  Third, the SEC stated that “a market maker 
may not effect a short sale…if the market maker knows that the customer’s or counterparty’s 
transaction will result in the customer or counterparty establishing or increasing an economic net 
short position (i.e., through actual positions, derivatives, or otherwise) in the issued share capital 
of a firm covered by this Order.”  This language seems designed to discourage the use of listed 
or OTC derivatives to take a bearish position in the covered stocks, though its main result was 
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 probably to provide market makers with considerable incentives to avoid knowledge of a 
customer or counterparty’s net positions. 
On Monday, September 22, the three major exchanges announced a number of additions 
to the list of banned stocks.  For example, the NYSE added 32 stocks to the list on this day and 
44 stocks on the following day.  Many of these additions were clearly financial stocks that were 
simply overlooked by the SEC as it drew up its initial list, but industrial firms with a large 
finance subsidiary (such as General Motors and General Electric) were added to the shorting ban 
list as well.  Additions continued on subsequent days at a slower pace.  For example, the NYSE 
added 13, 9, and 7 stocks on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, respectively.  Also, four NYSE 
firms and four Nasdaq firms asked to be removed from the shorting ban list on various days.  
These removals included REITs as well as a few broker-dealers and asset managers who did not 
want to look hypocritical, given that at least some of their revenues relied on the continued 
viability of short sales.
3 
On October 2, 2008, at the end of the initial 10-day effective period, the SEC extended 
the ban to the earlier of October 17, 2008 or three business days following enactment of TARP  
(formally known as H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008).  President 
Bush signed the bill into law on the afternoon of Friday, October 3 immediately after it passed 
both houses of Congress, and the SEC then announced that the ban would expire at 11:59pm ET 
on Wednesday, October 8, 2008.  As of October 9, shorting was again permitted in all listed 
stocks as long as market participants complied with the requirement to borrow shares in advance, 
as mandated by the naked shorting ban, which continued to remain in effect. 
 
4.  Data 
Most of the analysis covers the period from August 1 through October 31, 2008.  We also 
examine stock returns through the end of 2008.  We merge five different datasets.  Stock returns 
are from CRSP, and the NYSE’s TAQ database is used to calculate market quality and other 
intraday measures.  The NYX and Nasdaq websites provide dates and details about stocks 
initially included on, added to, and/or deleted from the shorting ban list.  From both the NYSE 
and Nasdaq, we have data on all executed short sales from August 1, 2008 through October 31, 
                                                 
3 We examine the removed firms separately, but given the small sample size, the results are too noisy to draw any 
useful statistical inference about the effects of voluntarily withdrawing from the ban list. 
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 2008.  The format is the same as the data required to be made public from January 2005 to July 
2007 under Regulation SHO.  For each transaction executed on either the NYSE or Nasdaq 
involving one or more short sellers, a record identifies the time of the transaction, the ticker 
symbol, the trade price, and the share volume that involves a short-seller.  Finally, the exchanges 
collect and release short interest data twice per month for each listed stock, and we examine the 
evolution of short interest through all of 2008. 
To be included in the sample, stocks must be listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq from 
December 31, 2007 through October 31, 2008, and there must be TAQ data each day from 
August 1, 2008 through October 31, 2008.  Listing in 2007 is required because we create a 
matched sample based on trading activity during the first half of 2008.  Based on the match to 
CRSP, we initially retain only common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11), which means we 
exclude securities such as warrants, preferred shares, American Depositary Receipts, closed-end 
funds, and REITs.  After applying these filters, there are 404 stocks in the sample out of the 
original SEC list of 797 stocks subject to the shorting ban, and an additional 61 stocks in our 
sample later become subject to the shorting ban, for a total of 465 NYSE and Nasdaq common 
stocks in the sample that are subject to the shorting ban at some point.  Table 1 provides further 
details on the filters applied. 
  We also create a matched sample of 465 stocks where shorting was never banned, 
matched on listing exchange, the presence or absence of listed options, market capitalization at 
the end of 2007, and dollar trading volume from January through July 2008.  The distance metric 
is the absolute value of the proportional market-cap difference between the non-banned match 
candidate and the banned stock plus the analogous absolute value of the proportional dollar 
trading volume difference.  For each stock subject to the ban, we choose with replacement the 
non-banned stock that is listed on the same exchange, has the same options listing status, and has 
the smallest distance measure.  
In robustness tests, we also consider non-common stocks and matches based on industry. 
Specifically, we take all 3-digit SIC codes where at least one firm appears on the ban list and at 
least one firm does not.  Then we exclude ADRs, closed-end funds (but not REITs), ETFs, and 
partnerships. For each of the 62 ban list firms in this subset, we then find a matching firm that is 
listed on the same exchange and minimizes our distance metric based on market cap and volume.  
This subsample is small, because in most of the financial industries, all stocks were subject to the 
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 ban.  Thus, this matching procedure yields a sample that is dominated by firms in non-financial 
industries with modest financial arms. It also differs from the base sample in that securities other 
than common stocks are included. 
One last subsample is of interest.  In July 2008, the SEC announced a temporary 
emergency ban on naked shorting in 19 large financial stocks.  These firms included all of the 
primary dealers in Treasury securities as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, so this list 
includes the largest investment and commercial banks with the most extensive debt securities 
market operations.  Eight institutions on this list survive our filters, including Bank of America, 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and J.P. Morgan Chase.  These firms were probably 
the ones expected to receive the most government assistances, and we sometimes refer to this 
group as the “largest TARP firms.”  We examine them separately, because it appears the shorting 
ban was designed in part to assist these large, systemically important firms. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the sample of firms subject to the shorting ban 
and the matched sample of firms where shorting was never banned, using data for the period 
from August 1 to October 31, 2008.  For each of these groups we report means (Panel A) and 
medians (Panel B) for the pre-ban period, the ban period, and the post-ban period.  The matching 
procedure seems to work well, as banned and non-banned stocks have very similar liquidity 
measures during the pre-ban period.  For example, effective spreads average 0.74% for stocks on 
the original ban list vs. 0.70% for matching control stocks during the pre-ban period. 
 
5.  Methodology 
We describe the changes around the duration of the shorting ban graphically and in two-
way fixed effect panel regressions. Most of the figures compare the 404 sample stocks on the 
original ban list to the 404 matched control stocks where shorting is never banned.  We use this 
subset of banned stocks in the figures because the event date is the same for all of them, making 
it easy to visually identify the effects of the ban by comparing banned stocks to otherwise similar 
non-banned stocks. 
The panel regression analyses in Tables 3 through 5 formally incorporate all 465 * 2 = 
930 stocks in the sample, including stocks that were added to the ban list after September 19 as 
well as matching control stocks.  Using this sample and various subsets, we estimate the 
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 following two-way fixed effects model for a variety of left-hand side variables Yit measured for 
matched pair i on day t: 
,ܻ ௜௧ ൌߙ ௜ ൅ߛ ௧ ൅ߚܦ ௜௧
஻஺ே ൅ߠܺ ௜௧ ൅ߝ ௜௧        ( 1 )  
 
 
where Yit is the measured quantity Y for the banned stock less the measured quantity for its non-
banned match.  On the right-hand side, a matched pair fixed effect and calendar day dummies are 
present, and D
BAN is an indicator variable set equal to one if and only if the shorting ban is in 
effect for the banned stock in matched pair i on day t.  Also included is Xit, a vector of pairwise 
differences for the following control variables:  market cap, dollar trading volume, the 
proportional daily range of transaction prices, and the daily volume-weighted average share price 
(VWAP).  
The matched pair fixed effect means that we take out any differences between two stocks 
in a pair that are present during the non-ban period.  The calendar effects take out any broad 
market moves in the quantity of interest.  The control variables are designed to pick up time-
variation in the matching variables as well as any effects due to volatility or share price level, 
though it turns out that none of those effects are important – all of our inference is unchanged 
when we exclude these control variables.  Thus, our overall strategy is to identify the effect of 
the ban on a particular quantity Y by comparing banned stocks to matching non-banned stocks 
during the ban vs. at other times.  Said another way, this panel is a differences-in-differences 
methodology that can accommodate the staggered introduction and removal of the shorting ban 
across stocks. 
Statistical inference is conducted using Thompson (2009) standard errors.  This technique 
allows for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation of the regression errors, as well as 
heteroskedasticity.  In general, we find that these robust standard errors are very similar to OLS 
standard errors, suggesting that the two-way fixed effects are removing most of the correlation 
that is present across observations.
4 
 
                                                 
4 Thompson (2009) variance-covariance matrices are not guaranteed to be positive definite, and estimated standard 
errors can turn out negative in finite samples if the true error terms are close to being independent across 
observations.  In about 1% of all cases, we obtain negative standard error estimates for coefficients of interest.  
When this happens, we report and use White (1980) standard errors for inference. 
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 6.  Effects on shorting activity and trading activity 
Table 2 and Figure 1 provide details on shorting activity for the different groups of stocks 
before, during, and after the ban.  Note first that banned and non-banned stocks have very similar 
amounts of shorting activity prior to the ban, suggesting that our matching procedure produces a 
set of very comparable stocks.  For the 404 sample stocks on the original shorting ban list, short 
sales account for a cross-sectional average of 21.78% of trading volume during the pre-ban 
period from 1 Aug through 18 Sep (RELSS).  For the matched set of control stocks that are never 
subject to the shorting ban, the corresponding number is 19.48%.  Not surprisingly, the shorting 
ban had a dramatic effect on short selling activity, but shorting does not decline to zero.  During 
the shorting ban (19 Sep through 8 Oct), short sales are 7.71% of overall trading volume for 
stocks on the original ban list, compared to 18.23% of overall trading volume over the same time 
interval for the matching set of non-banned stocks.  Recall that market-makers (including but not 
limited to specialists and options market-makers) are able to short as part of their market-making 
and hedging activities, and these are probably the short sales that we observe during the ban 
period. 
These remaining short sales could reflect trades by market-makers acting as a middleman 
for market participants who are now forced to take an economic short position using derivatives.  
For instance, a hedge fund could buy puts on financial stocks instead of shorting them directly.  
An options market-maker might sell this put to the hedge fund and then delta hedge its risk by 
shorting the appropriate amount of the underlying stock.  As another example, a hedge fund 
could short a financial stock ETF (ETFs were not subject to the shorting ban).  A market-maker 
might purchase the ETF shares and hedge its risk by shorting the stocks underlying the ETF.  
However, it is not possible to directly assign the whole 7.71% shorting figure to bearish traders 
that are attempting to circumvent the ban on short sales, because market-makers short for other 
reasons.  For instance, if an entity wants to take a long position in a financial stock, a market-
maker may sell short in order to provide liquidity to that buyer.  Nevertheless, the low shorting 
numbers suggest there was not massive substitution by hedge funds and other short sellers into 
derivatives that were then hedged by market-makers. 
It is interesting to examine the exact timing of the decline in shorting activity.  On 
Thursday, September 18, the naked shorting ban goes into effect, and on this day there is 
statistically less shorting activity across the board.  Compared to an average of 19.5% for the 
10 
 whole pre-ban sample period, shorting accounts for only 15.6% of volume in the control stocks 
that Thursday, and 16.6% for the financial stocks that will appear on the SEC’s original list on 
Thursday evening.  (Recall that at this point, market participants do not know that a shorting ban 
is on its way.)  These are the smallest shorting numbers in the whole pre-ban period, and they 
suggest that the pre-borrow requirement imposed by the naked shorting ban significantly 
impeded shorting activity.  In fact, Table 2 Panel A shows that shorting in non-banned control 
stocks remains at a lower average level during and after the shorting ban (18.2% of volume 
during the ban, 18.7% of volume during the post-ban sample period), further suggesting that the 
naked shorting ban had at least some effect on shorting activity.  The large amount of shorting 
activity in non-banned stocks on September 19 is somewhat inconsistent with this story (shorting 
is 33.5% of trading volume in non-banned stocks on that day), but there are at least two possible 
explanations.  It could be that market participants anticipated an expansion of the shorting ban 
and rushed to get short positions in place.  Non-banned stocks might have served as substitutes.  
September 19 was also a witching day, and the imminent expirations of September options and 
futures could account for that day’s burst of shorting activity in the non-banned stocks. 
Once the ban is lifted on October 9, shorting in the banned stocks increases sharply.  For 
a few days, though, there is still a gap between the two groups that gradually narrows.   The gap 
seems to be gradually closing over those days, so it could be that it takes some time for market 
participants to adjust their trading strategies.  It could also be that the naked shorting ban, which 
continues even when shorting is again permitted, has a differential effect, limiting shorting in 
financial stocks more than it limits shorting in other stocks. Alternatively, the increasing scrutiny 
on short positions in financial stocks may discourage some traders.  Whatever the explanation, 
within a week the two groups again exhibit similar shorting activity.  In fact, over the whole 
post-ban sample period from 9 Oct through 31 Oct, Table 2 Panel A shows that shorting is on 
average 18.7% of volume in non-banned stocks vs. 18.2% of volume for our sample stocks on 
the original ban list, and this difference is not statistically significant (t = 1.64).   
Short interest in banned stocks (measuring the total short positions outstanding on a given 
date) also declines sharply during the shorting ban and stays at lower levels thereafter.  Figure 2 
shows the cross-sectional median level of short interest for our sample stocks during 2008, 
measured as a fraction of shares outstanding.  Short interest is collected twice per month, based 
on positions of record around the 15
th and the end of each month, so only the September 30 
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 observation is inside the ban period. Median short interest in banned stocks during the latter half 
of September falls by 0.6 percentage points to 5.8% of shares outstanding.  This decline is 
strongly significant, both in raw terms and relative to short interest in matching control stocks, as 
it is the biggest half-month change in short interest observed during 2008.  After the ban is lifted, 
short interest continues to fall modestly through the rest of 2008 for both groups of stocks. 
The effects of the ban on shorting activity are so strong that there is probably little need 
for additional formal tests, but in Table 3, we use panel regressions on all three shorting activity 
measures to show that the ban reduced shorting activity.  Based on the full sample results 
reported in Panel A, the shorting ban reduces the average stock’s daily number of trades 
involving a short seller by 1,967 (t = 7.03).  The average banned stock sees a decline of 513,087 
shares sold short per day (t = 5.51), and the fraction of trading volume involving a short seller 
declines by 11.8 percentage points (t = 7.12).  Panel B reports results for the subsample that also 
includes an industry match, and the results are quite similar. 
Panel C of Table 3 partitions the sample by market-cap quartile, and it is clear that the 
impact of the shorting ban differs cross-sectionally.  The shorting ban has the biggest and most 
reliable effect on large-cap stocks.  Perhaps the easiest measure to interpret is RELSS, the 
fraction of trading volume involving a short seller.  In the smallest quartile, RELSS declines by 
6.2 percentage points, and this decline is not statistically significant.  By contrast, the reliability 
of the effect increases monotonically with size, and in the two largest-cap quartiles, shorting as a 
fraction of volume falls by a strongly significant 14.8 and 16.0 percentage points.  For the 
sample of 8 systemically important firms, shorting also declines sharply, with RELSS falling by 
10.7 percentage points.  One possible explanation for this cross-sectional variation is that hedge 
funds and other high-frequency short sellers may disproportionately trade large-cap stocks 
because of their greater liquidity, and these market participants may have been the hardest hit by 
the shorting ban. 
Table 3 also shows that under the ban, short sellers are not replaced by an equal number 
of long sellers.  Compared to the stocks not subject to the ban, daily trading volume in the 
banned stocks falls by an average of $34.8 million (t = -2.56) during the ban period.  The average 
number of reported trades per day falls by 1,257 relative to the non-banned stocks (t = 4.01).  In 
results not reported, we also find that average trade sizes during the ban increase significantly on 
the banned financial stocks.  We are not sure why this is so, but anecdotal evidence indicates that 
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 the NYSE floor became more important during this volatile period, and even on the all-electronic 
Nasdaq market there may have been fewer computer-driven algorithmic trades during this 
period. 
 
7.  Effects on stock prices 
If the disagreement models are right and the shorting ban prevents at least some 
pessimists from taking a bearish position in a financial stock, the announcement of the shorting 
ban should cause prices of affected stocks to rise, leading to overvaluation relative to the 
fundamentals.  However, it is not clear whether we should expect a very large stock price effect.  
First, a market participant could use ETFs, puts, credit-default swaps, or other derivative 
instruments to take a bearish position.  Second, the shorting ban is temporary.  When the shorting 
ban is announced, the market knows that the SEC is initially limited to a 30-day ban absent some 
sort of legal change in the regulator’s rulemaking abilities.  If there were common knowledge 
that a shorting ban would last at most 30 days, one might expect only a modest stock price 
reaction.  However, this does not describe the situation at the start of the shorting ban.  The 
market was very surprised by the SEC’s move and might have expected additional actions after 
expiration of the emergency order.  For example, the SEC could attempt to make the shorting 
ban longer-lived through formal rulemaking or impede short sales in other ways in the future.  
Ultimately, the magnitude of the stock price effect is an empirical question, and we let the data 
speak. 
The other challenge is the presence of confounding events during the shorting ban.  On 
the same day that the shorting ban takes effect, the US Treasury announces a temporary 
guarantee program for money market funds, and the Fed announces a program to lend against 
high-quality asset-backed commercial paper.  Most importantly, Treasury secretary Henry 
Paulson announces the creation of what came to be known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP).  While there are no details in Paulson’s initial statement and press conference, it is not 
surprising that financial firm equity holders would respond positively to the announcement of a 
program “to remove these illiquid assets that are weighing down our financial institutions and 
threatening our economy.” 
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 Figure 3 shows cumulative raw returns for the 404 sample stocks that are on the SEC’s 
original shorting ban list, as well as cumulative returns for the set of 404 matched control stocks 
where shorting is never banned.  Interestingly, the banned and control stocks have statistically 
indistinguishable mean returns during the 1 Aug to 17 Sep pre-event period, suggesting that the 
treated stocks and the control stocks are quite similar.  The next day (18 Sep), the naked shorting 
ban is announced and implemented, only one day before the ban on shorting financial stocks.  
The naked shorting ban affects the prices of both groups of stocks:  the non-banned control 
stocks rise by an average of 4.37%, while the financial stocks in our sample that will appear on 
the next day’s shorting ban list rise by an average of 12.38% (!) on this day.  This 8.01% return 
difference could be due to the differential effect of the naked shorting ban on financial stocks.  
But it is difficult to assign the stock price effect to the prohibition on naked shorting, because 
there was other news on this day that could have a differential effect on financial stocks.  For 
instance, Christopher Cox announced on Wednesday evening that the SEC would require 
disclosure of large short positions, and pension funds in New York and California announced on 
Thursday that they would temporarily stop lending financial stocks to short sellers.  The Federal 
Reserve also added $300 billion of liquidity to financial markets on Thursday, and rumors about 
what would become TARP started circulating widely on Thursday afternoon.
5 
On Fri 19 Sep, prices impound the news of the day, including the announcement and 
immediate implementation of the emergency shorting ban.  The banned stocks rise by an 
additional 8.71% that day, compared to an average 4.02% return for the matched control stocks 
where shorting is never banned. As the ban continues, both sets of stocks decline sharply, losing 
about 30% of their value over this period, but the effects are broadly similar for banned and non-
banned stocks. 
If the disagreement models are right, a temporary ban should have a temporary price 
effect, and the price rise should reverse when the ban ends.  There is some evidence of that price 
reversal right around the end of the ban.  On October 9, when shorting resumes, the 404 banned 
stocks fall by an average of 12.38%, compared to a price decline of “only” 7.62% for the 
matched non-banned stocks.  By itself, this suggests a price effect of almost 5% associated with 
the ban, which is virtually identical to the analogous estimate of the price effect from the start of 
                                                 
5 Vikas Bajaj and Jonathan D. Glater, “Bid to Curb Profit Gambit as Banks Fall” and Edmund L. Andrews, “Federal 
Reserve and Treasury Offer Congress a Plan for a Vast Bailout,” New York Times, Sep 19, 2008. pg. A.1. 
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 the ban on September 19.  But this 5% relative price decline is completely reversed the next day 
(October 10), making it hard to be sure that the shorting ban is behind these price changes.  In 
fact, Figure 2 tells a cautionary tale, as it indicates that banned stocks outperform the non-banned 
match stocks by about 30% through the end of 2008.  Much of this accrues during the shorting 
ban, and the permanence of the cumulative return suggests it is due to news about fundamentals, 
not the shorting ban. 
To try to escape the confounding news about TARP and fundamentals, we look at the 
subset of firms that are added to the ban list at a later date.  There are 61 such firms in our 
sample, and they are matched in the same way to a firm where shorting is never banned.  There 
are a handful of financial firms in this group, but many if not most are non-financial firms with a 
financing arm.  For example, firms in this group include General Electric, General Motors, and 
IBM.  In addition to avoiding the contemporaneous confounding news about TARP, these later 
additions should have share prices that are on average much less sensitive to TARP news and 
other government efforts to stabilize the financial sector. 
Figure 4 follows cumulative equally-weighted excess returns on the firms added later to 
the ban list vs. their matched non-banned counterparts.  The displayed confidence interval 
extends 1.96 standard deviations above and below zero, calculated using excess return data for 
these firms during the pre-event period from August 1 through September 17.   The figure begins 
with the announcement of the ban on September 19.  Note that for these 61 firms, average excess 
returns on this day are very close to zero (0.37%, to be precise).  Perhaps market participants do 
not expect the ban to be expanded; perhaps they do not expect it to increase share prices even if 
it is expanded.  As we continue to follow these firms, they gradually become subject to the ban.  
The majority are added to the ban list over the next two days, with the rest added over the course 
of the next two weeks.  Interestingly, Figure 3 never shows a price bump for these stocks as a 
group.  They underperform the matched sample during the entire ban interval, and this 
underperformance is borderline statistically significant by October 8.  This suggests that for these 
stocks, any artificial price boost from the shorting ban is outweighed by associated negative price 
effects. 
What could these negative price effects be?  We have thought of two possibilities.  One is 
an illiquidity discount.  The evidence in the next section indicates that market quality was 
severely degraded during the shorting ban, and this could have been reflected in lower share 
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 prices.  Another possibility is that the market interpreted the addition to the ban list as a negative 
signal about that company’s prospects.  After the initial ban list came out, company management 
generally had to put in a request to be on the ban list, and market participants may have 
wondered whether those companies had something to hide. 
What should we expect at the end of the shorting ban?  For the vast majority of stocks 
subject to the shorting ban, investors know when the ban is to expire well before it actually 
happens, and it is not clear when this information should be incorporated into prices.
6  For 
example, if agents have different valuations but are otherwise rational, the price should react 
when the market learns that the shorting ban is to end.  In contrast, if optimists and pessimists 
rely only on their own valuations, as implied by Miller (1977), stock price effects should appear 
only on the day that shorting resumes.  In our event, the market gradually learns about the end 
date of the shorting ban.  On October 2, 2008, the SEC extended the ban to the earlier of October 
17, 2008 or three business days following enactment of the bailout package.  Prior to the SEC 
announcement, most participants expected the ban to last until October 17, and by this point it 
was pretty clear that the bailout package was close to passage, so this announcement of the 
extension probably shortened participants’ expected duration of the shorting restrictions.  On Fri 
3 Oct, the bailout passed and was signed into law, and the SEC that day announced that shorting 
in affected stocks would resume on Thu 9 Oct.   
Thus, if there are price effects related to the ending of the ban, we might see them on Thu 
9 Oct, or we might see them on Thu 2 Oct or Fri 3 Oct.  Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of 
banned stocks’ cumulative abnormal returns (relative to the non-banned match firms) as the 
resumption of shorting approaches.  On Thu 2 Oct and Fri 3 Oct, the abnormal returns on the 404 
original-list banned stocks relative to matched control stocks are 2.15% and 0.97%, respectively. 
For the sample of 61 firms that are added later to the ban list, abnormal returns are relatively 
small in magnitude on these two days, at -0.88% and 0.51%, respectively.  None of these are 
significant, which suggests that the positive effect of TARP, if any, has been incorporated into 
prices earlier.  
For the two days surrounding the end of the ban (8 Oct and 9 Oct), the abnormal returns 
on these 404 banned financial stocks are quite negative, averaging -2.35% and -4.77%, 
                                                 
6  For four NYSE stocks and four Nasdaq stocks, the end of the ban is announced and implemented on the same day, 
prior to the end of the ban, in response to a request from the firm’s management to be removed from the list of 
banned stocks. 
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 respectively.  Over the next several days, however, the previously banned stocks recoup virtually 
all of these losses.  Results are similar for the 61 firms that are added to the list later.  Excess 
returns are -8.10% on 9 Oct and 4.97% on the following day.  Thus, the evidence here remains 
mixed.  Abnormal returns are significantly negative, particularly on the first day that shorting 
was again permitted, which suggests that the shorting ban was indeed propping up the prices of 
the affected stocks.  But since the price effect is soon reversed, a longer view points to no lasting 
price effects from lifting the ban. This, in turn, is not consistent with temporary overvaluation as 
predicted by Miller (1977). Instead, it suggests that the positive price response at the beginning 
of the ban is related to the anticipated bailout package and other initiatives announced 
contemporaneously. 
 
8.  Effects on market quality 
Do short sellers tend to provide or demand liquidity on average?  In this section we use 
the shorting ban to investigate this question.  The evidence in Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) 
and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009) indicates that short sales are extremely prevalent in 
recent years.  In late 2007, approximately 40% of trading volume involves a short seller.  In 
contrast, short interest represents only about 4% of shares outstanding.  Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang (2008) show that this discrepancy means that short sellers on average maintain their 
positions for a much shorter period of time.  Anecdotal evidence indicates that much of this high-
frequency shorting activity is conducted by quant hedge funds.  These hedge funds are typically 
not registered market-makers and so would be subject to the ban.  But the evidence in Khandani 
and Lo (2007) suggests that many of these quant funds do in fact provide liquidity.  This 
suggests that the shorting ban might worsen market liquidity, even with an exception for 
registered market-makers. 
For each common stock each day, we calculate RES, the trade-weighted proportional 
round-trip effective spread on all trades.  The effective spread is defined as twice the 
(proportional) distance between the trade price and the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of 
the trade.  We use trades at all market venues, and we use the national best bid and offer prices to 
calculate the quote midpoint prevailing the second prior to the transaction.  In a similar fashion 
we also calculate RQS, the proportional quoted spread based on the national best bid and offer 
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 prices.  However, we focus more on effective spreads, because transactions sometimes take place 
at prices within the quoted bid and ask prices, due to the presence of hidden orders or due to 
price improvement by intermediaries.  Note that spreads are really an illiquidity measure:  the 
wider the effective spread or quoted spread, the less liquid is the stock. 
We also calculate the five-minute price impact of a trade.  We sign trades as either buyer-
initiated or seller-initiated based on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, and the price impact 
measures the proportional distance the quote midpoint moves in the direction of the trade.  For 
buyer-initiated trades, the price impact measure RPI5 is measured as the proportional difference 
between the quote midpoint five minutes after the trade and the trade price.  For seller-initiated 
trades, the price impact is the same proportional price change but of opposite sign.  Again, price 
impacts are an illiquidity measure:  the bigger the price impact, the more a given trade tends to 
push the price over the next five minutes. 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the various groups of stocks in various 
intervals of time.  For each group of stocks, we calculate a time-series average over the stated 
time interval and then calculate a cross-sectional mean (Panel A) or median (Panel B).  We focus 
on effective spreads, but the results for quoted spreads are very similar.  As mentioned earlier, 
original ban list stocks and control stocks have very similar average market quality measures 
prior to the ban, suggesting that the matching procedure works well.  During the 1 Aug to 18 Sep 
pre-ban period, average effective spreads are 74 basis points for stocks on the initial ban list and 
70 basis points for the set of matching stocks.  While the shorting ban is in effect, these market 
quality measures diverge wildly.  Median effective spreads do widen from 33 to 52 basis points 
for the control stocks, but median effective spreads for the stocks on the initial ban list more than 
triple, from 42 to 145 basis points.  This represents a dramatic change in the liquidity of stocks 
subject to the shorting ban. 
The magnitude of the changes is even more apparent in Figure 5.  Note that the figure 
corresponds to Table 2 Panel A, as it uses cross-sectional means.  Stocks subject to the shorting 
ban become far less liquid during the ban period.  Once the ban ends, the two groups move much 
closer together in terms of effective spreads, but a gap persists for at least two more weeks.  Only 
at the very end of October do effective spreads for banned and non-banned stocks again coincide.  
Interestingly, liquidity remains very poor for both sets of stocks, perhaps because stock market 
volatility remains extremely high.  From Table 2 Panel A, during the post-ban period the mean 
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 effective spread for stocks on the initial shorting ban list is 164 basis points, compared to 146 
basis points for the matching set of control stocks.   
Price impacts also show similar behavior.  During the pre-ban period, mean 5-minute 
price impacts are 33 basis points for banned stocks vs. 29 basis points for the matching set of 
control stocks.  During the shorting ban, average price impacts increase to 76 basis points for 
banned stocks vs. 47 basis points for the non-banned stocks.  During the post-ban period, these 
price impacts remain very high, averaging 68 basis points for banned stocks vs. 59 basis points 
for the matched non-banned stocks. 
Panel regressions confirm these results using all 465 * 2 = 930 sample stocks, including 
stocks that are added to the shorting ban list after October 19.  Recall that the panel regressions 
employ matched pairs and include firm-specific and calendar dummies as well as other control 
variables, so broad market effects are eliminated, and the change in market quality is identified 
by comparing otherwise similar banned and non-banned stocks on a given day.  Based on the 
numbers in Panel A of Table 4, the shorting ban is associated with quoted spreads that are 37 
basis points wider (t = 2.11), and effective spreads that are 32 basis points wider (t = 3.01).  Price 
impacts show an increase as well; the shorting ban is associated with an 11 basis point increase 
in 5-minute price impacts (t = 2.01).   
While it is hard to imagine, it is possible that the degraded market quality during the 
shorting ban is due solely to confounding changes in the information environment, including the 
tremendous volatility of fundamentals and the rapid pace of news about TARP and other matters.  
We try to control for this in two ways.  First, we limit the analysis to firms that were added to the 
shorting ban list after 19 Sep.  Second, we add an industry match, which limits the analysis to 
industries where some firms were banned and some were not.  This removes nearly all financial 
firms from the analysis. 
Panel B of Table 4 has the results for the subsample that includes an industry match.  
Compared to matched stocks that are not subject to the shorting  ban, effective spreads widen out 
by 18 basis points (t = 2.71).  While the point estimate of the effect on market quality is smaller 
than for the whole sample, it is more precisely estimated, perhaps because this subset excludes 
most of the very volatile large financial stocks.  There are similar results for quoted spreads.  
Panel C has the results for firms that are added to the ban list later.  For that sample, effective 
spreads widen by an average of 33 basis points (t = 6.18), and quoted spreads widen by virtually 
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 identical amounts.  In both subsamples, price impacts are reliably higher as well, though the 
effects are more modest for this measure.  Overall, the sharp widening of spreads seems to be 
clearly caused by the shorting ban. 
The shorting ban is also associated with a large increase in price volatility.  We measure 
intraday volatility using the proportional intraday range (RVOL), defined as the difference 
between the highest and lowest transaction price recorded for a given stock on a given trading 
day, divided by the stock’s volume-weighted average trade price for that day.  Figure 6 shows 
the cross-sectional average of the range variable for each trading day, comparing the original ban 
list stocks to matched stocks that are never subject to the shorting ban.  Here the matching does 
not seem to have completely eliminated differences in the two groups prior to the ban.  For 
example, average intraday price ranges are 6.09% for stocks on the original SEC list vs. 5.16% 
for the matched control stocks, based on the numbers in Table 2 Panel A.  Stocks on the original 
SEC list experience a sharp increase in intraday range volatility during the shorting ban (an 
average of 11.58% for initial ban stocks vs. 8.55% for control stocks).  This gap seems to 
continue, but only for a few days after the ban comes to an end.  Interestingly, the banned stocks 
and the matched non-banned stocks look most similar during the latter part of October, as there 
is essentially no difference in volatility between the two groups for that part of the post-ban 
period.  The formal statistical tests are contained in Table 4, and based on the full sample results 
in Panel A the shorting ban is associated with an additional 3.81 percentage points of intraday 
range (t = 4.98).  When we remove most financial institutions by limiting the sample to firms 
added to the ban list after 19 Sep, Panel C shows that range volatility increases by a very similar 
3.74 percentage points on average.  For the 62 banned firms that can be matched to a non-banned 
firm in the same industry, Panel B shows a significant increase in average range volatility equal 
to 2.08 percentage points (t = 2.35).  
When we sort banned firms into four market cap quartiles, we find some notable cross-
sectional differences.  The results are in Table 4 Panel C.  Market quality for the smallest quartile 
does not get worse during the shorting ban.  This is true for all four of our market quality 
measures:  effective spreads, quoted spreads, price impacts, and range volatility.  But for all of 
the other quartiles, market quality worsens markedly during the ban.  Compared to the matched 
control stocks, effective spreads widen by 22 basis points for the top quartile, and 58 and 45 
basis points for the middle two quartiles.  For the subset of eight systemically important firms, 
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 effective spreads widen by 18 basis points.  All of these estimates are reliably different from 
zero, and all represent a similar proportional widening in spreads.  The same is true of the other 
market quality measures.   
Overall, it seems quite clear that market quality is markedly worse for all but the smallest 
stocks subject to the shorting ban.  This makes sense, as the shorting ban temporarily excluded 
many market participants, including hedge funds and proprietary trading desks, that were not 
formally market-makers but typically would provide substantial amounts of liquidity via 
shorting. 
 
9.  Short-sale aggressiveness 
Next we examine whether the market-makers who short during the shorting ban are 
different from the population of short sellers at other times.  Because we have intraday data on 
the time and price of every executed short sale, we can measure the average effective spread (in 
basis points) that short sellers pay.  For a transaction in stock i at time u, we measure the 
proportional effective spread Fiu as: 
 
  Fiu =  2 (Miu – Piu) / Miu,          ( 2 )  
 
where Piu is the price at which shares are sold short at time u, and Miu is the prevailing quote 
midpoint at the time of the short sale.  We scale by 2 to make these effective spread numbers 
comparable to the broader market effective spreads discussed earlier.  We then compute trade-
weighted averages for each day to aggregate these individual-firm effective spreads up to a 
trading day level.  Note that this measure is positive if short-sellers demand liquidity on average 
and negative if they supply liquidity on average. 
We also calculate the 5-minute price impact for all short sales as in the previous section, 
except that we use only executed short sales in the calculation.  Because we are only dealing with 
sales here, a positive price impact for short sales measures the midquote decline in the five 
minutes after the short sale, and it is a measure of the short-term informativeness of the short 
sale. 
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 Figure 7 and Table 2 compare the measures across different groups and over time.  Along 
this dimension, the matching procedure seems to have worked well.  Prior to the shorting ban, 
there is no difference in the behavior of short sellers for the 404 initially banned financial stocks 
in the sample vs. the matched non-banned control stocks.  Median effective spreads for short 
sellers in Table 2 Panel A are -1 basis point in both groups, indicating that on average short 
sellers have a very slight bias toward supplying liquidity in the pre-ban period.  Average 5-
minute price impacts on short sales are similarly tiny. 
When the shorting ban takes effect, short sellers do not significantly change their overall 
aggressiveness in non-banned stocks, and there is no significant change in short sale price 
impacts for this set of stocks.  For example, the median effective spread for short sellers for the 
control group is still -1 basis point.  In contrast, for the stocks on the original ban list, those who 
can still sell short become much more aggressive on average, paying a median effective spread 
of 15 basis points to complete their short sales during the shorting ban.  They are also slightly 
more informed during the shorting ban, at least based on subsequent five minute returns.  Median 
short sale price impacts in banned stocks go from -2 basis points during the pre-ban period to 8 
basis points during the ban.  Panel A of Table 5 has the full-sample panel regression results for 
short sale effective spreads and short sale price impacts.  During the shorting ban, those who 
short sell affected stocks pay an additional 21 basis points in effective spread, and short sale 
price impacts are 20 basis points higher in the banned stocks.  Interestingly, while the divergence 
in the two groups during the shorting ban is very clear from Figure 7, the regression results are 
only marginally significant, with t-statistics below two, perhaps because effective spreads paid 
by short sellers are quite noisy.  Finally, Figure 7 also shows that short sale effective spreads in 
banned stocks return to their normal value near zero a few days after shorting is again permitted, 
though these numbers are much more volatile during the post-ban period.  The aggressiveness 
result is also present for the subsample of firms that were added to the ban list later, but Panel B 
shows that changes in aggressiveness during the ban are not statistically significant for the 
subsample of banned firms that are matched to a non-banned firm in the same industry.  Panel C 
shows that there are no clear cross-sectional patterns in shorting aggressiveness. 
To the extent that the results are significant, what explains the increase in effective 
spreads and price impacts associated with short sales during the shorting ban?  The only market 
participants who can short sell during the ban are market-makers, so the results simply indicate 
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 that these traders tend to demand immediacy.  This makes sense.  If an options market-maker 
sells a put, for example, she will have a strong desire to hedge that trade as quickly as possible, 
and may use market orders to eliminate her exposure to price moves in the underlying stock.  
Similar arguments apply to any other market-maker who finds himself with a need to short to 
hedge away some sort of long exposure. 
 
10.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the September 2008 SEC emergency order that temporarily 
banned most short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks. Using proprietary NYSE and Nasdaq 
data, we show that shorting activity drops by an average of 65% in affected stocks.  The 
remaining short sellers (who should be exclusively market-makers) tend to demand immediacy, 
probably to quickly satisfy their hedging needs.  Stocks subject to the ban suffered a severe 
degradation in market quality, as measured by spreads, price impacts, and intraday volatility. 
Banned stocks jump in price on September 19, and there is a sharp but temporary decline 
in price when the shorting ban ends and shorting resumes on October 9.  But there is significant 
confounding news on September 19.  TARP is announced (though without any details), Treasury 
announces a money-market fund guarantee program, and the Fed announces new lending 
programs against asset-backed commercial paper.  When we look at those firms added to the ban 
list after September 19, we find no price increase at all, suggesting that the ban itself did little to 
boost returns. Instead, financial firms on the ban list appear to have benefitted largely from the 
anticipated bailout programs. 
Given the evidence, it is not at all clear that the SEC achieved its unstated goal of 
artificially raising prices on financial stocks, and it is clear that market quality was severely 
compromised.  Should the SEC have done it?  While it may seem clear that the answer is no, it is 
certainly possible that manipulative shorting was a risk for financial stocks during this time 
period.  If there are indeed multiple equilibria, and if short sellers can somehow get a Diamond-
Dybvig (1984) bank run started, they will ensure a share price of zero.  In fact, earlier in 
American history, bank managers and owners were well acquainted with this possibility, and 
most banks were privately held as a result. 
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 Another possibility is that this was a time when we needed financial stocks to be 
overvalued.  Perhaps systemic risk imposes negative externalities throughout the system, and it 
was optimal for the SEC to artificially support financial stocks in order to reduce systemic risk.  
Or perhaps behavioral finance is right and investors are prone to waves of excessive pessimism 
and optimism due to herding, extrapolation bias, or some other form of bounded rationality.  If 
investors were unduly pessimistic, perhaps this kind of regulatory intervention could have 
changed investors’ outlook and confidence. 
Nevertheless, with the benefit of some hindsight, it now seems much less likely that short 
sellers are to blame for the sharp declines in financial stocks during 2008.  It is now clear that 
financial firms such as Citigroup had and have extremely troubled fundamentals, and this rather 
than abusive shorting probably explains the low stock price levels on these types of stocks.  It 
may be too soon to judge, but we suspect that after some time has passed, future observers will 
look back at this shorting ban with the same kind of wonder that economists reserve for Nixonian 
price controls and other similarly fruitless and costly government interventions. 
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 Panel A. Sample selection
Total number of stocks on SEC and exchange ban lists 931
Lost because three ticker pairs ambiguously refer to class A/B stocks ‐6
Stocks are not continuously listed and traded between 12/31/2007 and 10/31/2008 ‐56
Remaining stocks 869
Panel B. Distribution of 869 stocks across listing venues
NYSE 299
AMEX 30
Nasdaq 540
Panel C. Distribution of 839 NYSE and Nasdaq‐listed stocks from Panel B
Other than common stocks 111
Stocks with no trading on at least one day during Aug‐Oct 2008 257
Stocks removed due to other data issues 6
Stocks in final sample (202 NYSE and 263 Nasdaq) 465
Table 1. Securities subject to ban on short sales
28Panel A. Means
pre-ban ban post-ban pre-ban ban post-ban pre-ban ban post-ban pre-ban ban post-ban
Number of stocks 404 404 404 404 404 404 61 61 61 61 61 61
Number of days 34 14 17 34 14 17 34 14 17 34 14 17
RQS 0.0100 0.0256 0.0235 0.0094 0.0157 0.0204 0.0037 0.0101 0.0098 0.0031 0.0061 0.0067
RES 0.0074 0.0188 0.0164 0.0070 0.0117 0.0146 0.0030 0.0083 0.0076 0.0024 0.0045 0.0051
RPI5 0.0033 0.0076 0.0068 0.0029 0.0047 0.0059 0.0014 0.0038 0.0035 0.0012 0.0022 0.0025
Daily number of trades 6,680 6,433 7,790 4,588 6,052 7,279 10,477 11,411 14,765 9,414 12,588 14,645
Market cap ($ billions) 3.272 3.919 3.517 1.508 1.938 2.276 4.632 5.373 6.707 2.601 3.387 4.003
Daily trading volume ($ millions) 69.841 66.749 64.214 51.777 60.225 59.043 121.591 134.878 122.906 114.832 132.882 126.266
Relative range 0.0609 0.1158 0.1196 0.0516 0.0855 0.1159 0.0604 0.1198 0.1505 0.0435 0.0737 0.1036
Daily shorting volume (shares) 575,140 190,396 541,267 293,317 362,316 422,721 896,320 380,262 1,015,791 537,931 636,525 745,514
Daily short-sale transactions 2,559 694 2,399 1,492 1,798 2,176 3,711 1,504 4,155 3,006 3,497 4,025
RELSS 0.2178 0.0771 0.1821 0.1948 0.1823 0.1867 0.2194 0.0807 0.1754 0.2271 0.2013 0.2067
Shorting RES -0.0004 0.0023 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0019 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005
Shorting RPI5 -0 0001 0 0015 -0 0003 -0 0002 0 0000 -0 0004 -0 0002 0 0009 -0 0002 -0 0002 0 0001 -0 0003
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
original ban list
matched sample of never banned 
stocks added to ban list later
matched sample of never banned 
stocks
The pre-ban period is 8/1/2008 - 9/18/2008, the ban period is 9/19/2008-10/8/2008, and the post-ban period is 10/9/2008-10/31/2008. The original ban list includes sample stocks that are included 
on the SEC's initial short-ban list. Added stocks refer to securities that were later added to the shorting ban list. The sample of never-banned stocks is matched based on listing exchange, market cap, 
trading volume; stocks must also match on whether they have listed options.  Relative quoted spreads (RQS) are time-weighted; relative effective spreads (RES) are trade-weighted. RPI5 is the five-
minute price impact. Each of these three measures is scaled by the quote midpoint. Number of trades and share volume refer to trading activity on the listing exchange.  Relative range is a day's 
highest price minus the lowest price, divided by the day's VWAP. Shorting volume and number of shorts include both NYSE and Nasdaq shorting flow during official trading hours. RELSS is 
shorting volume divided by share volume. Shorting RES is the actual RES accrued by executed short sell orders. Similarly, Shorting RPI5 is the actual price impact associated with short orders. % 
aggressive short volume is the percentage of short sales that execute at prices below the quote midpoint.
Shorting RPI5 -0.0001 0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003
% aggressive shorting volume 0.5041 0.5275 0.5131 0.5001 0.5060 0.5012 0.5078 0.5075 0.5018 0.5122 0.5098 0.5071
Panel B. Medians
RQS 0.0055 0.0184 0.0142 0.0042 0.0070 0.0105 0.0025 0.0088 0.0070 0.0021 0.0040 0.0044
RES 0.0042 0.0145 0.0100 0.0033 0.0052 0.0068 0.0020 0.0070 0.0057 0.0016 0.0030 0.0031
RPI5 0.0020 0.0066 0.0046 0.0016 0.0026 0.0034 0.0010 0.0036 0.0027 0.0008 0.0014 0.0015
Daily number of trades 1,015 670 891 1,321 1,267 1,380 4,713 3,782 5,174 5,504 5,861 5,864
Market cap ($ billions) 0.184 0.140 0.169 0.256 0.280 0.310 1.205 0.703 1.053 0.978 1.251 1.658
Daily trading volume ($ millions) 3.446 2.648 2.812 4.265 3.716 3.226 17.880 11.349 9.851 21.063 28.292 22.328
Relative range 0.0545 0.1035 0.1138 0.0480 0.0763 0.1070 0.0572 0.1123 0.1310 0.0424 0.0674 0.1004
Daily shorting volume (shares) 39,576 14,019 30,879 49,568 53,575 54,180 250,408 69,569 203,518 230,164 245,737 306,546
Daily short-sale transactions 276 41 200 329 289 324 1,212 431 1,184 1,408 1,467 1,768
RELSS 0.2179 0.0630 0.1849 0.1973 0.1908 0.1962 0.2189 0.0664 0.1718 0.2217 0.2003 0.2096
Shorting RES -0.0001 0.0015 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
Shorting RPI5 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001
% aggressive shorting volume 0.5047 0.5174 0.5041 0.5023 0.5067 0.5048 0.5038 0.4938 0.5026 0.5084 0.5152 0.5032
29Panel A. Matched on exchange, options-listing status, market cap, and trading volume (465 matched pairs)
Dependent variable ban_dummy mkt cap dvol relrange vwap adj. R
2
Number of trades -1,257 -0.148 48 19,072 -38 82%
(-4.01) (-1.56) (8.35) (4.17) (-1.11)
Dollar volume -34,759,711 1,146 225,943,842 -628,803 45%
(-2.56) (0.21) (3.11) (-0.49)
Shorting volume (shares) -513,087 -64 4,151 2,498,764 7,882 54%
(-5.51) (-2.48) (3.61) (2.12) (1.39)
Number of shorts -1,967 -0.077 16 4,570 13 60%
(-7.03) (-0.81) (3.96) (2.31) (0.69)
RELSS (%) -11.782 0.000 -0.001 -2.422 0.014 25%
(-7.12) (0.81) (-3.03) (-1.23) (0.68)
Panel B. Also matched on industry (62 matched pairs)
Dependent variable ban dummy mkt cap dvol relrange vwap adj R
2
Two-way fixed effect regressions of market quality on a ban dummy and other explanatory variables, using a daily panel of 
matched stock pairs from 8/1/2008 to 10/31/2008.  Each stock where shorting is banned is matched to a stock listed on the same 
exchange that never appears on the ban list.  Matching minimizes the sum of the percentage differences in market capitalization and 
dollar trading volume; pairs must also match on whether they have listed options.  Panel B also matches on 3-digit SIC code, and 
thus only includes industries where some stocks are subject to the shorting ban and some are not.  Each regression variable is the 
difference between the banned stock and its match. The ban dummy equals one on stock-days when short selling is banned in one 
of the two paired stocks, and is zero otherwise.   Number of trades and dollar volume refer to aggregate trading activity on NYSE 
and Nasdaq. Shorting volume and number of shorts include both NYSE and Nasdaq shorting flow during official trading hours. 
RELSS is shorting volume divided by share volume.  Control variables include pairwise differences in market cap and trading 
volume (dvol) in $millions, intraday price range, and share price (vwap).  T-statistics based on Thompson (2009) standard errors 
are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  In Panel C, only the ban dummy coefficient for each regression is reported in 
the table.  Market cap quartiles in Panel C are based on average market value of equity during the first half of 2008.
Table 3. The effect of the shorting ban on trading and short selling volume
Dependent variable ban_dummy mkt cap dvol relrange vwap adj. R
2
Number of trades -1,750 -0.495 53 12,835 2 87%
(-3.08) (-1.06) (5.79) (2.17) (0.03)
Dollar volume -17,692,672 702 60,874,244 -353,291 74%
(-1.26) (0.35) (1.35) (-1.00)
Shorting volume (shares) -406,568 -12 4,180 976,532 143 77%
(-3.41) (-0.36) (3.85) (2.55) (0.04)
Number of shorts -1,591 0.045 17 2,756 -16 80%
(-3.94) (0.32) (5.10) (1.80) (-0.98)
RELSS (%) -8.344 0.000 -0.002 -7.178 -0.023 33%
(-4.55) (1.51) (-1.24) (-2.12) (-1.09)
Panel C. Ban-dummy coefficients for regressions on various sample subsets
Dependent variable
Largest 
TARP firms
Later additions 
only
Quartile 1 
(small cap) Quartile 2 Quartile 3
Quartile 4 
(large cap)
Number of trades -9,827 -2,526 -177 -16 -699 -5,182
(-0.97) (-3.77) (-4.51) (-1.05) (-3.19) (-5.83)
Dollar volume 26,488,283 -25,636,922 24,282 -505,658 -1,355,172 -81,050,576
(0.05) (-2.58) (0.06) (-0.50) (-0.39) (-4.83)
Shorting volume -6,124,872 -766,324 -15,789 1,941 -158,397 -2,114,384
(-4.57) (-2.90) (-1.95) (0.07) (-4.11) (-4.74)
Number of shorts -25,010 -3,119 -93 -178 -807 -7,575
(-4.61) (-3.62) (-3.11) (-3.49) (-4.23) (-6.43)
RELSS (%) -10.718 -15.518 -6.230 -11.025 -16.014 -14.833
(-5.53) (-11.36) (-0.86) (-2.76) (-5.07) (-9.72)
Number of pairs 8 61 116 116 117 116
30Panel A. Matched on exchange, options-listing status, market cap, and trading volume (465 matched pairs)
Dependent variable (in %) ban_dummy mkt cap ($b) dvol ($b) relrange vwap adj. R
2
RQS 0.373 0.001 -0.125 3.456 0.002 39%
(2.11) (0.33) (-3.38) (8.40) (0.74)
RES 0.321 0.002 -0.146 3.921 0.002 36%
(3.01) (0.82) (-3.79) (10.01) (1.15)
RPI5 0.109 0.002 -0.062 1.957 0.000 22%
(2.08) (1.53) (-3.74) (10.78) (0.45)
Relative range 3.815 -0.099 4.146 -0.097 31%
(4.98) (-1.81) (3.68) (-4.79)
Panel B. Also matched on industry (62 matched pairs)
Dependent variable (in %) ban_dummy mkt cap ($b) dvol ($b) relrange vwap adj. R
2
RQS 0.171 0.027 -0.162 1.447 0.000 62%
(1.65) (1.38) (-1.30) (3.82) (0.07)
RES 0.182 0.021 -0.130 1.972 0.000 60%
(2.13) (1.34) (-1.34) (4.96) (0.14)
RPI5 0.072 0.007 -0.068 1.039 0.000 46%
(1.74) (1.14) (-1.72) (5.07) (0.35)
Relative range 2 076 -0 015 3 698 -0 038 26%
Table 4. The effect of the shorting ban on market quality
Two-way fixed effect regressions of market quality on a ban dummy and other explanatory variables, using a daily panel of matched 
stock pairs from 8/1/2008 to 10/31/2008.  See Table 3 caption for a description of matching and explanatory variables.  Dependent 
variables include time-weighted relative quoted spreads (RQS), trade-weighted relative effective spreads (RES), and equal-weighted 
five-minute price impact (RPI5).  Each of these three measures is scaled by the quote midpoint.  Relative range is a day's highest 
trade price minus the lowest price, divided by the day's VWAP.  T-statistics based on Thompson (2009) standard errors are in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  In Panel C, only the ban dummy coefficient for each regression is reported in the table.  
Market cap quartiles in Panel C are based on average market value of equity during the first half of 2008.
Relative range 2.076 -0.015 3.698 -0.038 26%
(2.10) (-0.11) (1.26) (-0.71)
Panel C. Ban-dummy coefficients for regressions on various sample subsets
Dependent variable (in %)
Largest 
TARP firms
Later additions 
only
Quartile 1 
(small cap) Quartile 2 Quartile 3
Quartile 4 
(large cap)
RQS 0.202 0.351 -0.849 0.848 0.570 0.271
(2.65) (5.07) (-1.56) (6.65) (6.56) (5.80)
RES 0.183 0.331 -0.145 0.576 0.453 0.225
(2.58) (6.18) (-0.38) (5.21) (9.76) (5.98)
RPI5 0.059 0.160 -0.168 0.228 0.231 0.092
(2.18) (4.53) (-0.97) (4.21) (7.24) (5.07)
Relative range 3.257 3.738 -1.621 5.496 3.886 5.040
(1.14) (2.74) (-1.00) (3.79) (2.94) (3.48)
Number of pairs 8 61 116 116 117 116
31Panel A. Matched on exchange, options-listing status, market cap, and trading volume (465 matched pairs)
Dependent variable (in %) ban_dummy mkt cap ($b) dvol ($b) relrange vwap adj. R
2
Shorting RES 0.206 0.001 0.017 0.082 -0.002 2%
(1.65) (1.38) (0.37) (0.00) (-1.13)
Shorting RPI5 0.199 0.000 -0.001 -0.072 -0.001 2%
(1.92) (0.88) (-0.90) (-0.25) (-0.96)
Aggressive shorting volume fraction -1.831 -0.001 0.282 0.845 -0.026 5%
(-0.20) (0.33) (0.46) (0.40) (-1.39)
Shorting RES for aggressive shorts 0.877 0.001 -0.096 3.207 0.000 19%
(6.76) (0.19) (-2.72) (7.56) (3.38)
Shorting RES for passive shorts -0.459 0.001 0.099 -2.932 -0.003 21%
(-1.58) (0.12) (2.89) (-7.32) (-5.75)
Panel B. Also matched on industry (62 matched pairs)
Dependent variable (in %) ban_dummy mkt cap ($b) dvol ($b) relrange vwap adj. R
2
Shorting RES 0.001 0.154 0.251 0.003 -0.055 7%
(0.48) (1.37) (0.40) (0.50) (-2.55)
Shorting RPI5 0.001 0.038 -0.111 0.000 -0.013 1%
(1.71) (0.65) (-0.23) (-0.06) (-0.91)
Ai h t i l f t i 0 025 0 415 11 894 0 028 0 473 5%
Table 5. The effect of the shorting ban on shorting aggressiveness
Two-way fixed effect regressions of market quality on a ban dummy and other explanatory variables, using a daily panel of matched 
stock pairs from 8/1/2008 to 10/31/2008.  See Table 3 caption for a description of matching and explanatory variables.  Dependent 
variables include the actual relative effective spread accrued by executed short sell orders (shorting RES), the 5-minute price impact 
associated with short orders (shorting RPI5), the percentage of short sales that execute at prices below the quote midpoint 
(aggressive shorting volume fraction), and RES for short sales partitioned by aggressiveness.  T-statistics based on Thompson 
(2009) standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  In Panel C, only the ban dummy coefficient for each 
regression is reported in the table.
Aggressive shorting volume fraction 0.025 0.415 11.894 0.028 -0.473 5%
(1.07) (0.41) (0.42) (0.55) (-1.53)
Shorting RES for aggressive shorts 0.003 0.422 -0.437 0.026 -0.066 28%
(1.35) (1.44) (-0.28) (3.80) (-1.70)
Shorting RES for passive shorts -0.003 -0.180 0.774 -0.022 -0.025 27%
(-2.39) (-1.25) (0.79) (-3.56) (-0.69)
Panel C. Ban-dummy coefficients for regressions on various sample subsets
Dependent variable (in %)
Largest 
TARP firms
Only later 
additions
Quartile 1 
(small cap) Quartile 2 Quartile 3
Quartile 4 
(large cap)
Shorting RES 0.024 0.169 0.888 0.194 0.204 0.015
(0.68) (2.03) (0.78) (2.93) (2.91) (0.69)
Shorting RPI5 -0.023 0.104 1.737 -0.030 0.133 0.007
(-0.63) (2.03) (1.72) (0.59) (3.71) (0.42)
Aggressive shorting volume fraction -2.481 -0.879 -10.158 -8.511 3.126 -2.269
(-0.99) (-0.20) (0.19) (-0.38) (-1.80) (1.27)
Shorting RES for aggressive shorts 0.256 0.668 2.474 1.200 0.826 0.379
(3.25) (4.80) (1.50) (4.93) (8.51) (6.26)
Shorting RES for passive shorts -0.140 -0.394 -0.434 -0.725 -0.446 -0.296
(-1.81) (-2.99) (0.50) (-1.86) (-4.74) (-4.62)
Number of pairs 8 61 116 116 117 116
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Figure 1.  Short-sale activity around the U.S. shorting ban.  The firm-level short-selling activity measure (RELSS) is calculated for 
each stock each day as the number of shares sold short on the NYSE and Nasdaq in that stock divided by total trading volume in that 
stock.  For each day from 1 Aug 2008 through 31 Oct 2008, we report the equal-weighted average for 404 NYSE and Nasdaq 
common stocks on the initial shorting ban list vs. 404 common stocks that are never banned from short-selling and which are matched 
on listing exchange, pre-sample market cap and dollar trading volume, and whether or not the stock has listed options. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1-Aug 8-Aug 15-Aug 22-Aug 29-Aug 5-Sep 12-Sep 19-Sep 26-Sep 3-Oct 10-Oct 17-Oct 24-Oct 31-Oct
RELSS non-banned match RELSS banned
Ban started Ban expired
 34 
 
Figure 2.  Short interest during 2008 on banned and non-banned stocks.  Median short interest (measured as a fraction of shares 
outstanding) for the sample of 465 NYSE and Nasdaq stocks where shorting is banned vs. an equal number of matched stocks that are 
not subject to the ban.  Dates are the short interest report dates, which are the 1
st and 15
th of each month.  Thus, only the Oct 1 figure 
reflects short interest during the shorting ban. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative returns on banned and non-banned stocks.  For each day from 1 Aug 2008 through 31 Dec 2008, we report 
the equal-weighted average cumulative return for 404 NYSE and Nasdaq common stocks on the initial shorting ban list, the equal-
weighted average cumulative return for a matched sample of 404 common stocks where shorting was never banned, and the 
cumulative return difference between the two. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative abnormal returns on stocks later added to ban list.  Abnormal returns are computed as the equal-weighted 
average for 61 stocks added to the shorting ban list after 19 Sep 2008 less the equal-weighted return on a matched sample of non-
banned stocks. 95% confidence intervals are for the cumulative abnormal return since 18 Sep 2008 and are based on pre-event 
volatility from 1 Aug through 17 Sep.   
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Figure 5. Market quality around the U.S. ban on short-selling.  Proportional effective spreads (RES) and 5-minute price impacts 
(RPI5) are measured for each stock each day.  For each day from 1 Aug 2008 to 31 Oct 2008, we report the equal-weighted average 
for 404 NYSE and Nasdaq common stocks on the initial shorting ban list vs. a matched sample of 404 common stocks that are never 
banned from short-selling. 
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Figure 6. Average-firm level volatility around the U.S. ban on short selling.  The volatility measure is the proportional trading 
range (RVOL), defined as the difference between the highest and lowest transaction price recorded for a given stock on a given 
trading day, divided by the volume-weighted average trade price for that day.  For each day from 1 Aug 2008 through 31 Oct 2008, 
we report the equal-weighted average for 404 NYSE and Nasdaq common stocks on the initial shorting ban list vs. a matched sample 
of common stocks that are never banned from short-selling. 
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 Figure 7.  Effective spreads for short sales around the U.S. shorting ban.  Average proportional effective spreads on short sales 
are measured for each stock each trading day.  For each day from 1 Aug 2008 through 31 Oct 2008, we report the equal-weighted 
average for 404 NYSE and Nasdaq common stocks on the initial shorting ban list vs. a matched sample of common stocks that are 
never banned from short-selling.  
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